Vietnamese President To Lam, centre left, waves as he arrives in Guangzhou, as he starts his three-day official visit to China on August 18, 2024. Photo: Xinhua via AP

Vietnamese President To Lam’s recent visit to China aims to revive red connections and Mao Zedong-Ho Chi Minh comradeship to strategically infuse political trust in the bilateral relationship. For a Beijing that is frustrated with the Western alliance salvo, the communist breeze from the South China Sea felt like a soothing balm. The visit comes against the backdrop of the U.S. and the Philippines wooing Vietnam to pressure and corner China in the South China Sea.

President Lam, after assuming the role of general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), strategically chose China as his first foreign visit destination, starting in Guangzhou, the birthplace of the CPV.

Unlike the Vietnam-U.S. relationship, where CPV actions are scrutinised for human rights violations and the American establishment’s condescending attitudes toward the Vietnam political system, the Vietnam-China comradeship is mutually appreciative and supportive, barring territorial contestations.

‘Shared future’

Vietnam and China also issued a joint statement, renewing their efforts to “strengthen the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries” and envisage building “a Vietnam-China community with a shared future”, given the overly antagonistic outer world.

The statement also underscored Xi Jinping’s emphasis on giving Vietnam a priority in China’s neighbourhood diplomacy and supporting Vietnam in upholding CPV leadership.

Mr. Lam also had a “working session” with the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Beijing to learn from Chinese Communist Party experiences in combating corruption and economic development. He also addressed the meeting and appreciated the CPC’s theoretical innovations and cadre training as integral to the Chinese governance model.

Mr. Lam was accompanied by six out of 15 members of the politburo of CPV. This reflects the current National Party Congress, CPV leadership aspirations in replicating CPC successes in strengthening the legitimacy at home to get re-elected at the 14th Party Congress, scheduled for 2026. This is also concordant with the CPV leadership’s ambition to build Vietnam into a socialist-oriented, high-income, developed country by 2045.

The joint statement emphasised the need for theoretical exchanges, experience sharing, and close cooperation between the CPV and CPC to advance socialism, highlighting their compatibility and cooperation. These alignments are being constructed to promote Chinese experiences as successful models for CPV and align with the socialist cause. Interestingly, during the Mao era, China agreed to transfer Bach Long Vi Island to Vietnam in 1957 because Beijing considered Hanoi a “comrade and brother”, as Julia Lovell argues. But this bonhomie was rather short-lived with the China-Vietnam 1979 war. This system compatibility, therefore, does not necessarily exhibit the convergence of their worldviews or strategic interests.

Expanding partnerships

During the visit, Vietnam and China signed 14 agreements, ranging from connectivity and infrastructure to healthcare, customs media, etc., to further consolidate and expand strategic partnerships. In 2023, the bilateral trade between China and Vietnam was valued at $171.9 billion. China remained Vietnam’s largest import market in the first seven months of 2024, up 34.9% from the previous year, with an estimated turnover of $79.2 billion. China was also Vietnam’s second-largest export market in the same period, with an estimated turnover of $33.38 billion, up 7.2%. China ranked fourth among countries investing in Vietnam in 2023 with $4.47 billion, up 77% from the previous year, and investing in over 700 projects. With 29.7% of all new projects in Vietnam during the first seven months of 2024, Beijing ranked as Hanoi’s most active investment partner. These high-level visits and trade investment data invariably exhibit burgeoning political bonhomie, given Washington’s apathy towards Hanoi and its growing economic dependence on Beijing.

Territorial disputes over the Paracel Islands, trade deficits, and security worries prompted Hanoi to pursue Bamboo Diplomacy, as proposed by Nguyen Phu Trong, the late general secretary of the CPV. Vietnam is carefully manoeuvring in complex international and regional security theatres, softly ‘hedging’ with the U.S., India, Russia, and Japan to safeguard and maximise its strategic interests.

For Vietnam, India is a monastery for religious pilgrimage, given Buddhist civilisational connections, while China is a site for ideological pilgrimage. China is revitalising shared revolutionary history and ideological alliances for strategic collaboration.

New Delhi may harness cultural connections and a shared history of colonial resistance to enhance its extensive strategic partnership with Hanoi.

While China-Vietnam exchanges are often hindered by inherent irritants, the relationship between India and Vietnam is free of any obstacles and characterised by shared ambitions for a prosperous and multi-polar Asia. “Act East” policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi aims to accelerate engagement with the region. By further deepening cultural and sustainable economic ties, Vietnam will be a driving force and natural partner, for India in the Southeast to uphold a shared vision for regional stability and global order.

Rajiv Ranjan is Associate Professor of Chinese Studies, Department of East Asian Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Delhi